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Policy Pulse – 28 March 2022 – Veritas Global

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Photo by Darya Jum on Unsplash


Key messages

  • Expanding Caspian natural gas pipeline supply will greatly benefit EU’s energy security in the 2030-time horizon and beyond

  • Had the White Stream project been realized, it would have brought more Caspian gas to EU, generating savings of between €24 bn to €48 bn in 2021 for natural gas users in EU

  • Increasing capacity of natural gas supply to EU will improve price stability

  • Support for receiving more LNG and development of new pipelines are mutually reinforcing policy measures that advance consumer interest

  • EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely while cost-effectively meeting its 2050 net carbon neutrality target

Background and context


On 8 March 2022 the European Commission proposed measures for addressing EU’s energy insecurity. The proposal identified diversification of supply as one of the key levers for addressing EU energy security. Specifically, the proposal looks to increase supply of non-Russian natural gas by sourcing more Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and increasing imports of pipeline natural gas. Other measures covered by the proposal include reducing demand for natural gas through developing renewable substitutes, including hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources.


The European Commission proposal outlines in detail immediate measures that can be taken to reduce EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas. However, for the 2030-time horizon the proposal simply extrapolates the current measures. In our view, there is an opportunity to improve EU’s energy security over the 2030-time horizon and beyond through focusing on increasing the capacity of new pipelines.


Our previously published analysis “Caspian Gas Is Key to EU Supply Diversification” highlighted that enhancing access to Caspian and Central Asian natural gas is the best option for EU supply diversification. Caspian gas is a critically needed supplement to EU’s hydrogen strategy. The hydrogen strategy is an ambitious program for long-term decarbonization, but it does little to address EU’s energy security needs over the next two to three decades.


This policy brief explains how the full operationalization of the White Stream project, which would bring natural gas from the Caspian to EU, can contribute to price stability for European consumers. Furthermore, this brief explains how development of new natural gas pipelines and support for new LNG supply are mutually reinforcing policies. The brief also highlights that continued use of natural gas can be fully compatible with EU’s 2050 net carbon neutrality target.


Increasing capacity of natural gas supply to EU will improve price stability


As shown in Table 1, if the White Stream project had been implemented, there would have been an increase in supply of 5.8% in the European market which would have resulted in a 24% decrease in the wholesale price of natural gas. On aggregate, this would have generated savings for users in the European Union of between €24 bn to €48 bn in 2021.


Table 1: Savings to EU consumers in 2021 if White Stream had been implemented

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The White Stream project, if fully operationalized, would bring 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from the Caspian to the European Union, which is the equivalent of about 5.8% of total natural gas consumption across Europe in 2021.


On aggregate, demand for natural gas is inelastic, meaning a large change in price is needed to produce a small change in quantity consumed. Short-term price elasticity of demand is estimated at - 0.24, which means that a 10% increase in price reduces demand by about 2.4%. In the absence of an estimate for short-term price elasticity of supply, this value for price elasticity of demand is assumed to be a reasonable proxy.


Using this short-term price elasticity, would mean that a 5.8% increase in supply would translate to a 24% decrease in the price, which if applied to the total natural gas spending by consumers would translate to savings to natural gas users in EU of about €48 billion in 2021. A more conservative approach for estimating the potential savings would be to calculate impacts only against the price increase since 2019, which we estimate at about €100 billion in the wholesale market. Using this more conservative approach would imply savings to natural gas users in EU of about €24 billion in 2021. While each approach has its merits, the range offers the most relevant reference point for policy makers.


A crucial point to realize is that the benefits of lower gas prices accumulate downstream and eventually are passed on to consumers. Given the structure of the gas market, these benefits are not captured by natural gas suppliers. In effect, the benefits of lower prices are transferred from current suppliers to consumers. This characteristic of the gas market means that existing suppliers of natural gas are incentivized to discourage entry of new suppliers. Given these features, there is a strong case for public sector intervention in facilitating new entry and development of diversified supply infrastructure.


Support for new LNG and development of new pipelines are mutually reinforcing policy measures that advance consumer interest


In our view, there is an opportunity to improve EU’s energy security over the 2030-time horizon and beyond by focusing more on increasing the capacity of new pipelines bringing gas from the Caspian. According to the European Commission, about 80% (or 50 bcm per year) of the natural gas supply diversification is planned to come from increasing LNG supply. The remaining 20% (10 bcm per year), is planned to come from new gas transported by pipelines. While this approach may be appropriate for the short-term, it is not appropriate for the medium term. Priority should be given to developing new natural gas pipelines.


Natural gas production cost modeling for the European market, commissioned by the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, identified a cost advantage of new pipeline gas projects over new LNG supply (See Figure 1). The production cost curve presented in Figure 1, identifies different sources of natural gas that could be supplied to the European market. The height of each bar corresponds to the cost of supplying the natural gas from a particular source to the European market whereas the width of the bar corresponds to the estimated volume that could be delivered per year from the identified source. Caspian gas offers a cost competitive option for supplying the European market and could deliver over 50 bcm per year.


Figure 1:

Base Case Gas Supply Cost Curve – 2035 (2015 prices)

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Source: Fossil Fuel Supply Curves, Report of the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, May 2016, prepared by Wood Mackenzie Ltd.


The impact of increasing access to new LNG compared to increasing new sources of piped gas has different consequences for the natural gas supply curve. The impacts from these mutually reinforcing measures would further European consumer interests.


Policy support that is targeted at increasing access to future LNG projects will flatten the slope on the tip (right-hand side) of the natural gas supply curve (see image I in Figure 2 below). The reason is because the vast majority of future LNG potential is on the right-hand side of the production cost curve, therefore, the supply response will largely impact this segment.


However, increasing support for gas from new (future) pipelines will shift the entire supply curve to the right. The shift will be less pronounced on the left-hand side of the supply curve and more pronounced in the middle (see image II in Figure 2 below). The scale and segment of the shift in the supply curve is presented in proportion to opportunities identified in the production cost curve from future piped gas.


If the two measures are pursued in parallel, the cumulative impact will be both a flattening of the slope of the tip of the supply curve and a shift in the supply curve. Basically, the sum of the two effects (see image III in Figure 2 below).


Figure 2:

Impact of policy support for new LNG and new pipes on natural gas supply curve

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Box 1: The Geographic Market – Is it Just Europe or Europe and Asia?

A relevant technical point to note, is that this analysis is done using the assumption that the geographic market for natural gas is Europe. However, some analysts consider that the relevant geographic market is broader and should encompass both Europe and Asia, as the two regions are linked indirectly through LNG trade. In fact, the price correlation across leading European and Asian benchmarks increased to 0.93 in 2021 compared to below 0.8 in 2019. Nevertheless, a correlation in spot prices across LNG products should not necessarily be interpreted as the existence of a single geographic market.


However, even if a broader geographic market definition is applied, that encompasses both Europe and Asia, the scale of the benefits estimated in the analysis from adding additional capacity would not change. Although, the benefits would be distributed more widely, accruing to both European and Asian consumers in the broader Europe-Asia natural gas geographic market. The addition of 32 bcm in 2021 would have increased supply in the broader Europe-Asia geographic market by about 2.2%. If the same price elasticity assumptions are used, this increase of supply would correspond to a decrease in prices by 9.2%. The benefits to consumers in 2021 would still have been in the range of €24 bn to €48 bn but these saving would be distributed more widely across the broader Europe-Asia geographic market.


Even under the broader geographic market definition, there are compelling reasons why Europe would find it in its interest to secure higher volumes of natural gas supply from the Caspian. The lower production cost of Caspian gas makes it possible for Europe to potentially lock in supply at a lower rate than offered through new LNG projects. Piped Caspian gas also offers the possibility to have certainty of supply and reduce over reliance on new LNG capacity, access to which depends on continuously outbidding Asia. Furthermore, enhanced access to piped gas from the Caspian will help reduce exposure of Europe against supply disruptions in natural gas markets.

EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely while cost-effectively meeting its 2050 carbon neutrality target


Carbon capture and storage technology offers a technically viable solution for capturing nearly all carbon dioxide emissions that result from the combustion of natural gas. Currently, this method is not economically attractive as it is cost prohibitive. However, with research, development, learning, and accommodative polices, carbon capture and storage technology has the potential to become commercially viable.


In the meantime, there are vast pools of cost-effective emission reduction opportunities in developing countries. The newly agreed rules at UNFCCC COP 26 for international collaboration under the Paris Agreement (also known as Article 6 of the Paris Agreement) offer an unparalleled opportunity for delivering the best greenhouse gas emission reductions, which can be used to offset emissions from using natural gas.


But capturing “tailpipe” emissions and offsetting are not the only options. The rapid progress in recent years in direct air carbon capture processes and technology has the potential to be truly transformational. Based on our forthcoming assessment, which is in the process of being peer reviewed, our estimate is that certain companies, through leveraging existing mature technology and process innovation, have achieved the ability to capture carbon directly from the air at a cost of between US$90 to US$130 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. While this is much more expensive than the abatement opportunities available in developing countries, it is comparable to the current price point of carbon emission permits in EU. The significance of this development is that direct air carbon capture conceptually offers endless opportunities for emission reductions at the same carbon price. In effect, this technology puts a price ceiling on reducing carbon emissions.


Whether it is through carbon capture and storage, carbon offsets, or direct air carbon capture processes, there are many options available for neutralizing greenhouse gas emissions. EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely and still meet its 2050 carbon neutrality target without incurring huge costs. Natural gas plays an important role in enabling greater renewable energy deployment by offering a viable solution for balancing capacity to manage fluctuations in renewable energy supply. Except for nuclear power, electricity generated through natural gas currently offers the most viable and low-carbon alternative to coal-based power as a solution for intermittency.


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About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.






 
 
 

Policy Pulse – 4 November 2021 – George Anjaparidze and Vicente Paolo Yu

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On 26 October 2021, Veritas Global published analysis: OECD inflates climate finance estimates ahead of COP 26. Our analysis shows that the OECD overestimated the scale of climate finance in 2019.


In total, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the amount of climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries in 2019 by US$ 46.9 billion – of which US$ 20.3 billion is due to overestimation in bilateral public climate finance and US$ 26.6 billion is due to overestimation for multilateral public climate finance.


The level of climate finance provided by developed countries points to a significant shortfall in following through on climate finance commitments. Developed countries committed to provide US$ 100 billion in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. Making good on developed country climate finance commitments under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement can help crowd-in much needed capital for scaling-up climate action in developing countries.


This paper makes public the methodology used by Veritas Global to critique the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report – Climate Finance Provided and Mobilized by Developed Countries – Aggregate trends updated with 2019 data.


I. Critique of bilateral public climate finance estimates


Context


To estimate the bilateral public climate finance, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report aggregated data from the fourth biennial reports submitted to the UNFCCC by developed countries. The report did not use data sources available to the OECD to adjust the reported data and correct for overestimation. It is important to note that for assessing other climate finance components (multilateral public, export credits and mobilized private) the OECD uses its own data sources (OECD DAC and OECD ESG) to estimate these components. In the methodology below, we explain how the Rio-markers contained in the OECD-DAC database could be used to assess the scale of overestimation of bilateral public climate finance in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Data considerations


Despite originating from different sources, the data tagged through the Rio-markers and aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report have significant overlaps. This is perhaps not surprising because almost all major developed countries use the Rio-markers methodology to, in part or in full, report on their climate finance contributions under the UNFCCC, which have subsequently been aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report. The developed countries that did not make a reference to the Rio-markers in their Fourth Biennial Report constituted about 8% of the climate finance tagged as climate relevant through the Rio-markers methodology in 2018.


From the major bilateral public finance contributors, only the United States and Canada did not make any reference to the use of Rio-markers in their Fourth Biennial Reports under the UNFCCC. The United Kingdom has made a reference to Rio-markers in past reports but has not explicitly referenced Rio-markers in its Fourth Biennial Report. However, the United Kingdom has developed accounting practices for climate finance that build on and go beyond the Rio-markers methods.

The similarity in data sets is also revealed when comparing aggregates on bilateral public climate finance reported in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report and the climate-relevant OECD Rio-markers reporting. Between 2013 to 2018, about 91% of the reported data is estimated to overlap (or at least correlate) between these sources (see chart below).

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According to the Rio-markers methodology, a project that has climate change as a secondary objective is tagged as climate “secondary/significant,” even if the share of finance supporting climate-specific activities is negligible. Once a project is tagged as climate “secondary/significant” most OECD countries report the finance based on a predetermined share (usually between 30% and 100%) as climate finance. This accounting practice leads to vastly overestimating the scale of bilateral climate finance. Therefore, we consider that it is inappropriate to count “secondary” projects as part of climate finance until a more robust methodology is developed for estimating the proportion of finance that really supports climate activities. To illustrate overestimation, we present an example of a project supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland. The Buikwe District project in Uganda supports implementation of a program that improves access to water, sanitation and hygiene services, however, the program also has secondary climate change related objectives. Climate change related issues are only one of several activities being financed. Nevertheless, since Iceland uses a predetermined share of 100% to report finance of “secondary” projects towards climate finance, all financial support reported for this project was tagged as climate finance. This clearly leads to over-reporting of climate finance.


Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Finland have developed more robust methods and report coefficients on a project-by-project basis for Rio-marked activities, including for projects that have climate change as their “principal” or “secondary” objective. In the future it may be appropriate to base estimations for “secondary” projects on these more robust methods but crucially there needs to be a coherent approach across developed countries.


Given the significant (about 91%) overlap or at least correlation in the data sets, we can estimate the proportion of the data in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report that corresponds to “principal” and “secondary” activities based on what has been tagged through Rio-markers. Using this approach implies a margin of error of about 10%, which we consider to be reasonable and more accurate than the current practice at OECD.


By not filtering out the finance associated with “secondary” projects from its assessment, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report has overestimated the total bilateral climate finance. We used the steps described below to estimate the amount by which the report has overestimated bilateral public climate finance of developed countries in 2019.


Steps to quantifying OECD overestimation


Step 1: Estimate share of bilateral public climate finance reported attributable to activities where climate change is a “secondary” objective.


To estimate the share of finance that supports projects where climate change is a secondary objective, we calculate the proportion of finance for “secondary” projects compared to total finance for “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018. (The 2018 ratio is used as a proxy for the 2019 ratio. The 2019 ratio was not used because at the time of preparing our analysis the 2019 ratio was not available to us.)


Formula:


ShareOfSecondary2018 = ($RMSecondary2018) / ($RMPrincipal2018 + $RMSecondary2018)


Where,

  • ShareOfSecondary2018 is the share of finance for projects where climate change is a “secondary” objective compared to total finance reported for climate “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018

  • $RMSecondary2018 is US$ amount of reported climate finance in 2018 for activities where climate change is a secondary objective as reported through the Rio-markers of OECD DAC

  • $RMPrincipal2018 is US$ amount of reported climate finance in 2018 for activities where climate change is a “principal” focus as reported through the Rio-markers of OECD DAC

Based on the above approach, the share of “secondary” projects was estimated at 70% in 2018.


Step 2: Estimate amount of bilateral public climate finance reported by OECD that corresponds with “secondary” projects


To estimate the amount of finance that is attributable to secondary projects, we apply the “ShareOfSecondary” derived in step 1 to the total bilateral climate finance reported for 2019 in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Formula:

$EstSecondary2019 = $TotalBilateralPublicCF2019 x ShareOfSecondary2018


Where,

  • $EstSecondary2019 is the estimated US$ reported climate finance for 2019 for activities where climate change is a secondary objective

  • $TotalBilateralPublicCF2019 is the US$ total bilateral public climate finance reported in 2019 as aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report

  • ShareOfSecondary2018 is the share of finance for projects where climate change is a “secondary” objective compared to total finance reported for climate “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018 (calculated in Step 1)

The amount US$ estimated for secondary projects in 2019 is equal to the amount by which the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report has overestimated total bilateral public climate finance for 2019.


Results for bilateral public climate finance


Based on the above calculations, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the scale of bilateral public climate finance in 2019 by about US$ 20.3 billion.


II. Critique of multilateral public climate finance estimates

Context


The OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report quantified multilateral public climate finance estimates using the OECD DAC database. The quantification includes both the annual contributions of developed countries to climate finance through multilateral channels as well as funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves. For climate finance raised by multilateral institutions themselves, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report attributes this finance in proportion of the developed country share capital. However, since the US$100 billion climate finance target is focused specifically on the finance provided and mobilized by developed countries (it is an outflow measure) it is not appropriate to count the funds raised by multilateral institutions towards the developed country annual climate finance target. (For more context and information on climate finance see Veritas Global analysis from 21 April 2021: Climate Finance is the Key to Success).


To be clear, the funds raised by multilateral institutions themselves should be reported and tracked as per the accounting modalities agreed at COP 24 because these resources are part of the climate finance ecosystem. However, resources raised by multilateral institutions themselves should not be counted towards the achievement of the US$100 billion climate finance target of developed countries. Only direct contributions from developed countries to developing countries through multilateral channels should be counted towards the US$100 billion climate finance target. In the methodology below we explain our approach to assessing the estimates of multilateral public climate finance in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Data considerations


There are no specific data considerations. The same data sources used by the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report are used for purposes of undertaking this analysis. Data for assessing the multilateral public climate finance is sourced from the OECD DAC database. For calculating attribution shares, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report uses the multilateral institutions’ annual reports.


The difference in conclusions between the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report and our analysis is entirely explained by definitions on what is eligible to be counted towards the US$ 100 billion climate finance target. By counting the funds raised by the multilateral institutions themselves towards the US$ 100 billion target the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the finance provided by developed countries. We used the steps described below to estimate the amount by which the report has overestimated multilateral public climate finance of developed countries in 2019.


Steps to quantifying OECD overestimation


Step 1. Estimate the share of multilateral public climate finance that corresponds to the funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves.


Using the OECD-DAC data (provider perspective), we filter out data based on imputed multilateral contribution of developed countries for 2018 – which was equal to about US$ 6.5 billion. We subsequently calculate the share of imputed multilateral contributions compared to total attributed multilateral public climate finance in 2018 (US$ 29.6 billion) as estimated by OECD. (Note, the 2018 ratio is used as a proxy for the 2019 ratio. The 2019 ratio was not used because at the time of preparing our analysis the 2019 ratio was not available to us.) Based on this assessment, we estimate that about 78% of the multilateral public climate finance in 2018 was overestimated.


Step 2. Estimate amount of multilateral public climate finance reported by OECD that does not correspond to imputed multilateral contribution of developed countries for 2019.


We multiply the OECD estimate for total multilateral public climate finance in 2019 by the overestimated share (78%) calculated in step 1 to obtain the amount overestimated.


Results for multilateral public climate finance


Based on these calculations, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the scale of multilateral public climate finance in 2019 by about US$ 26.6 billion.


For media queries: contact@veritasglobal.ch

Briefing prepared by:


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About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.




 
 
 
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