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Policy Pulse – 16 November 2021 – George Anjaparidze

Photo by UNclimatechange on Flicker


Key messages:

  • Announcements at COP 26 side-lines could potentially be more impactful than outcomes from formal negotiations

  • Sectoral initiatives targeting steel and aluminum need better representation

  • The global sectoral approach developed for international aviation holds valuable lessons for the steel sector and other heavy industries

Announcements at COP 26 side-lines could potentially be more impactful than outcomes of formal negotiations


The UK successfully shepherded climate negotiations towards a meaningful outcome as host of this year’s main UN climate conference (COP 26). The outcome of formal negotiations resulted in incremental progress across almost the entire negotiating agenda. To achieve this progress at a time of significant shortfalls in promised climate finance is impressive. Perhaps most notably, several decisions were taken that were critically needed to unlock greater cross-border cooperation on climate change mitigation under the Paris Agreement, including cooperation through carbon markets. But this year, more so than any previous year, what happened on the side-lines of the COP was arguably just as consequential, if not more so, than the outcomes of formal negotiations.


The UK presidency used COP 26 to announce new coalitions across government and non-government stakeholders to advance sectoral initiatives. This was done largely through the World Leaders Summit by launching the “Breakthrough Agenda”, with its own process, timelines and checkpoints. The overarching aim of this agenda is to work together to make clean technologies and sustainable solutions the most affordable, accessible, and attractive option in each of the targeted sectors. In addition, stand-alone initiatives were also kicked-off such as the International Aviation Climate Ambition Coalition as well as targeted initiatives for addressing sustainable forest and land use. Sectors covered by announcements from forged coalitions include agriculture, aviation, forestry, hydrogen, power, road transport, and steel.


Other countries also used COP 26 as a platform to announce bilateral initiatives. Perhaps the most widely covered announcement by international press was the US-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on enhancing climate action in the 2020s. However, other bilateral initiatives such as the US-EU announcement to negotiate a carbon-based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade could potentially have the largest practical implications in the near term. Bilaterally led initiatives can morph into broader coalitions, as can be observed in the case of the Global Methane Pledge, where this US-EU led initiative now includes over one hundred countries.


Sectoral initiatives have potential to build momentum for identifying technically feasible options for scaling-up climate action. But if representation of stakeholders excludes major industry or government actors, there is a risk that such initiatives only have marginal impact. The upcoming 12th Ministerial of the World Trade Organization could be an opportunity to create processes that give space for sectoral initiatives launched through bilateral or plurilateral approaches to feed into the multilateral system in the future. For example, in the context of future work of the WTO on the nexus of climate change and trade.


Sectoral initiatives targeting steel and aluminum need better representation


Issues related to greenhouse gas emissions in the aluminum and steel sectors were not specifically on the formal negotiating agenda at COP 26. However, aluminum and steel are getting increasing attention due to EU plans to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism targeting these sectors. Therefore, it is not surprising that announcements and declarations made on the side-lines of COP 26 targeted emissions from these sectors.


The steel sector is included in the "Breakthrough Agenda" launched at the World Leaders Summit. The initiative aims to have near-zero emission steel become the preferred choice in global markets, with efficient use and near-zero emission steel production established and growing in every region by 2030. The countries that have signed-up to the coalition include major steel producers in developed countries such as Japan, US and members of the EU as well as key producers among developing countries such as India, South Korea, and Turkey. However, the states included in the coalition only accounted for 31% of global crude steel production in 2019. Major steel producers such as China, Russia, and Brazil are not part of the coalition.


Furthermore, the US-EU announcement to develop a carbon-based sectoral arrangement that would include the steel sector would be representative of only about 13% of global crude steel production.


Lessons for the steel sector from international aviation


The first global sectoral approach that includes an absolute cap on CO2 emissions was developed for international aviation. The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), adopted by the UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in October 2016, addresses the growth in total CO2 emissions from international aviation. The International Air Transport Association (IATA), which at the time represented about 84% of global air traffic, played a critical role in developing workable solutions for the scheme. (ICAO is an international governmental organization, and IATA is a business association.)


The approach and design elements of the multilateral agreement addressing growth in CO2 emissions from international aviation hold valuable lessons for developing other sectoral schemes. Key lessons are highlighted below:


Include representative perspectives from industry and government in scheme design


The options developed by IATA tapped into industry specific knowledge. While the discussions at ICAO were particularly useful in highlighting the diverse set of perspectives, especially from developing and emerging economies. The scheme design features were often developed in small groups (usually championed by industry leaders), but for approaches to be palatable internationally, buy-in was essential from representative governance structures, including a balance between industry and government.


The coalition announced at COP 26 to address emissions from the steel sector may need to enhance representation through either growing the coalition or finding ways to feed its proposals into multilateral bodies with appropriate representation such as the World Trade Organization.


Focus on largest producers


In 2018, about 90% of international air traffic was performed by airlines registered in 22 countries plus the European Free Trade Association area. The scheme was made mandatory only for operations to and from these countries, while other countries were exempted by a de minimis provision. Through this exemption it was possible to have more meaningful exchanges on scheme design. Subsequently, after scheme agreement, through various incentives all countries were encouraged to participate in the scheme.


In 2019, the top 20 steel producing countries made up about 90% of crude steel production. An approach that starts by focusing on the largest producers may also be appropriate for the steel sector.


Do not try to solve other grievances


During negotiations between airlines, there were several attempts to use the climate issue to correct for other grievances and imbalances. Such attempts were largely unproductive. Any perceived imbalances, for example due to subsidies or capacity manipulation, are best handled through separate interventions. Otherwise, there is a heightened risk of failure in addressing the core climate concerns and could lead to unnecessarily dragging out negotiations.


For media queries: contact@veritasglobal.ch

Briefing prepared by:







George Anjaparidze


About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.




 
 
 

Policy Pulse – 4 November 2021 – George Anjaparidze and Vicente Paolo Yu


On 26 October 2021, Veritas Global published analysis: OECD inflates climate finance estimates ahead of COP 26. Our analysis shows that the OECD overestimated the scale of climate finance in 2019.


In total, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the amount of climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries in 2019 by US$ 46.9 billion – of which US$ 20.3 billion is due to overestimation in bilateral public climate finance and US$ 26.6 billion is due to overestimation for multilateral public climate finance.


The level of climate finance provided by developed countries points to a significant shortfall in following through on climate finance commitments. Developed countries committed to provide US$ 100 billion in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. Making good on developed country climate finance commitments under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement can help crowd-in much needed capital for scaling-up climate action in developing countries.


This paper makes public the methodology used by Veritas Global to critique the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report – Climate Finance Provided and Mobilized by Developed Countries – Aggregate trends updated with 2019 data.


I. Critique of bilateral public climate finance estimates


Context


To estimate the bilateral public climate finance, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report aggregated data from the fourth biennial reports submitted to the UNFCCC by developed countries. The report did not use data sources available to the OECD to adjust the reported data and correct for overestimation. It is important to note that for assessing other climate finance components (multilateral public, export credits and mobilized private) the OECD uses its own data sources (OECD DAC and OECD ESG) to estimate these components. In the methodology below, we explain how the Rio-markers contained in the OECD-DAC database could be used to assess the scale of overestimation of bilateral public climate finance in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Data considerations


Despite originating from different sources, the data tagged through the Rio-markers and aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report have significant overlaps. This is perhaps not surprising because almost all major developed countries use the Rio-markers methodology to, in part or in full, report on their climate finance contributions under the UNFCCC, which have subsequently been aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report. The developed countries that did not make a reference to the Rio-markers in their Fourth Biennial Report constituted about 8% of the climate finance tagged as climate relevant through the Rio-markers methodology in 2018.


From the major bilateral public finance contributors, only the United States and Canada did not make any reference to the use of Rio-markers in their Fourth Biennial Reports under the UNFCCC. The United Kingdom has made a reference to Rio-markers in past reports but has not explicitly referenced Rio-markers in its Fourth Biennial Report. However, the United Kingdom has developed accounting practices for climate finance that build on and go beyond the Rio-markers methods.

The similarity in data sets is also revealed when comparing aggregates on bilateral public climate finance reported in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report and the climate-relevant OECD Rio-markers reporting. Between 2013 to 2018, about 91% of the reported data is estimated to overlap (or at least correlate) between these sources (see chart below).

According to the Rio-markers methodology, a project that has climate change as a secondary objective is tagged as climate “secondary/significant,” even if the share of finance supporting climate-specific activities is negligible. Once a project is tagged as climate “secondary/significant” most OECD countries report the finance based on a predetermined share (usually between 30% and 100%) as climate finance. This accounting practice leads to vastly overestimating the scale of bilateral climate finance. Therefore, we consider that it is inappropriate to count “secondary” projects as part of climate finance until a more robust methodology is developed for estimating the proportion of finance that really supports climate activities. To illustrate overestimation, we present an example of a project supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland. The Buikwe District project in Uganda supports implementation of a program that improves access to water, sanitation and hygiene services, however, the program also has secondary climate change related objectives. Climate change related issues are only one of several activities being financed. Nevertheless, since Iceland uses a predetermined share of 100% to report finance of “secondary” projects towards climate finance, all financial support reported for this project was tagged as climate finance. This clearly leads to over-reporting of climate finance.


Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Finland have developed more robust methods and report coefficients on a project-by-project basis for Rio-marked activities, including for projects that have climate change as their “principal” or “secondary” objective. In the future it may be appropriate to base estimations for “secondary” projects on these more robust methods but crucially there needs to be a coherent approach across developed countries.


Given the significant (about 91%) overlap or at least correlation in the data sets, we can estimate the proportion of the data in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report that corresponds to “principal” and “secondary” activities based on what has been tagged through Rio-markers. Using this approach implies a margin of error of about 10%, which we consider to be reasonable and more accurate than the current practice at OECD.


By not filtering out the finance associated with “secondary” projects from its assessment, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report has overestimated the total bilateral climate finance. We used the steps described below to estimate the amount by which the report has overestimated bilateral public climate finance of developed countries in 2019.


Steps to quantifying OECD overestimation


Step 1: Estimate share of bilateral public climate finance reported attributable to activities where climate change is a “secondary” objective.


To estimate the share of finance that supports projects where climate change is a secondary objective, we calculate the proportion of finance for “secondary” projects compared to total finance for “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018. (The 2018 ratio is used as a proxy for the 2019 ratio. The 2019 ratio was not used because at the time of preparing our analysis the 2019 ratio was not available to us.)


Formula:


ShareOfSecondary2018 = ($RMSecondary2018) / ($RMPrincipal2018 + $RMSecondary2018)


Where,

  • ShareOfSecondary2018 is the share of finance for projects where climate change is a “secondary” objective compared to total finance reported for climate “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018

  • $RMSecondary2018 is US$ amount of reported climate finance in 2018 for activities where climate change is a secondary objective as reported through the Rio-markers of OECD DAC

  • $RMPrincipal2018 is US$ amount of reported climate finance in 2018 for activities where climate change is a “principal” focus as reported through the Rio-markers of OECD DAC

Based on the above approach, the share of “secondary” projects was estimated at 70% in 2018.


Step 2: Estimate amount of bilateral public climate finance reported by OECD that corresponds with “secondary” projects


To estimate the amount of finance that is attributable to secondary projects, we apply the “ShareOfSecondary” derived in step 1 to the total bilateral climate finance reported for 2019 in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Formula:

$EstSecondary2019 = $TotalBilateralPublicCF2019 x ShareOfSecondary2018


Where,

  • $EstSecondary2019 is the estimated US$ reported climate finance for 2019 for activities where climate change is a secondary objective

  • $TotalBilateralPublicCF2019 is the US$ total bilateral public climate finance reported in 2019 as aggregated in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report

  • ShareOfSecondary2018 is the share of finance for projects where climate change is a “secondary” objective compared to total finance reported for climate “principal” and “secondary” projects in 2018 (calculated in Step 1)

The amount US$ estimated for secondary projects in 2019 is equal to the amount by which the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report has overestimated total bilateral public climate finance for 2019.


Results for bilateral public climate finance


Based on the above calculations, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the scale of bilateral public climate finance in 2019 by about US$ 20.3 billion.


II. Critique of multilateral public climate finance estimates

Context


The OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report quantified multilateral public climate finance estimates using the OECD DAC database. The quantification includes both the annual contributions of developed countries to climate finance through multilateral channels as well as funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves. For climate finance raised by multilateral institutions themselves, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report attributes this finance in proportion of the developed country share capital. However, since the US$100 billion climate finance target is focused specifically on the finance provided and mobilized by developed countries (it is an outflow measure) it is not appropriate to count the funds raised by multilateral institutions towards the developed country annual climate finance target. (For more context and information on climate finance see Veritas Global analysis from 21 April 2021: Climate Finance is the Key to Success).


To be clear, the funds raised by multilateral institutions themselves should be reported and tracked as per the accounting modalities agreed at COP 24 because these resources are part of the climate finance ecosystem. However, resources raised by multilateral institutions themselves should not be counted towards the achievement of the US$100 billion climate finance target of developed countries. Only direct contributions from developed countries to developing countries through multilateral channels should be counted towards the US$100 billion climate finance target. In the methodology below we explain our approach to assessing the estimates of multilateral public climate finance in the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report.


Data considerations


There are no specific data considerations. The same data sources used by the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report are used for purposes of undertaking this analysis. Data for assessing the multilateral public climate finance is sourced from the OECD DAC database. For calculating attribution shares, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report uses the multilateral institutions’ annual reports.


The difference in conclusions between the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report and our analysis is entirely explained by definitions on what is eligible to be counted towards the US$ 100 billion climate finance target. By counting the funds raised by the multilateral institutions themselves towards the US$ 100 billion target the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the finance provided by developed countries. We used the steps described below to estimate the amount by which the report has overestimated multilateral public climate finance of developed countries in 2019.


Steps to quantifying OECD overestimation


Step 1. Estimate the share of multilateral public climate finance that corresponds to the funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves.


Using the OECD-DAC data (provider perspective), we filter out data based on imputed multilateral contribution of developed countries for 2018 – which was equal to about US$ 6.5 billion. We subsequently calculate the share of imputed multilateral contributions compared to total attributed multilateral public climate finance in 2018 (US$ 29.6 billion) as estimated by OECD. (Note, the 2018 ratio is used as a proxy for the 2019 ratio. The 2019 ratio was not used because at the time of preparing our analysis the 2019 ratio was not available to us.) Based on this assessment, we estimate that about 78% of the multilateral public climate finance in 2018 was overestimated.


Step 2. Estimate amount of multilateral public climate finance reported by OECD that does not correspond to imputed multilateral contribution of developed countries for 2019.


We multiply the OECD estimate for total multilateral public climate finance in 2019 by the overestimated share (78%) calculated in step 1 to obtain the amount overestimated.


Results for multilateral public climate finance


Based on these calculations, the OECD 2021 Climate Finance Report overestimated the scale of multilateral public climate finance in 2019 by about US$ 26.6 billion.


For media queries: contact@veritasglobal.ch

Briefing prepared by:



About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.




 
 
 

Policy Pulse – 26 October 2021 – George Anjaparidze and Vicente Paolo Yu


Key messages:

  • The OECD has overestimated the 2019 climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries by $46.9 billion.

  • The total shortfall in reaching the $100 billion target is about $67.4 billion, meaning that only $32.6 billion of climate finance has supported developing countries.

  • To avoid failure at COP 26, developed countries need to address the shortcoming in climate finance contributions by announcing a new pledge of $67.4 billion aimed at bridging the shortfall of the previous target.


Background on climate finance targets


Developed countries committed to provide $100 billion in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. This commitment was first made by developed countries in December 2009 in Copenhagen under the Copenhagen Accord that was noted by the Parties at COP15. The target was subsequently reiterated through various annual decisions under the UNFCCC beginning in 2010 in Cancun at COP16. This commitment of $100 billion annually has been extended under the Paris Agreement upon its adoption in 2015 to the post-2020 period up to 2025. The finance targets are seen as key enablers for scaling-up climate action in developing countries and more broadly as confidence building measures. (For more context and information on climate finance see Veritas Global analysis from 21 April 2021: Climate Finance is the Key to Success).


OECD overestimates climate finance provided by developed countries


Measuring progress against climate finance targets is not straightforward. The lack of internationally agreed metrics for measuring performance against the $100 billion target makes it difficult to definitively estimate climate finance flows. However, the methodology used by the OECD secretariat to estimate climate finance flows leads to overestimation.

The OECD secretariat estimated that in 2019 the climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries was equal to $79.6 billion. The OECD figures overestimate climate finance provided by $46.9 billion in 2019. When adjusted for overestimating, the climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries is about $32.9 billion in 2019. Meaning there is a shortfall of $67.4 billion in reaching the climate finance target. (See chart). There are two main drivers for OECD overestimation:

  1. Bilateral climate finance flows are overestimated by $20.3 billion in 2019. For bilateral climate finance, the OECD secretariat includes aggregation of projects that do not have climate change as the principal focus. A project that has climate change as a secondary objective is tagged as climate “significant”, even if the share of finance flowing to support climate specific activities is negligible. Once a project or program is tagged as climate “significant” most OECD countries report the finance based on a predetermined share (usually between 30% and 100%) as climate finance. This accounting practice of “climatewashing” bilateral assistance leads to significantly overestimating the scale of bilateral climate finance reported.

  2. Multilateral climate finance flows are overestimated by $26.6 billion in 2019. For climate finance that flows through multilateral channels, the OECD secretariat includes both the annual contributions of developed countries to climate finance through multilateral channels as well as funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves. However, since the $100 billion climate finance target is focused specifically on the finance provided and mobilized by developed countries (it is an outflow measure) it is not appropriate to count the resources mobilized by multilateral institutions towards the developed country annual climate finance target. Only direct contributions from developed countries to multilateral channels should be counted.


Implications for COP 26 and beyond


There is an urgent need to address the shortcoming in developed country climate finance contributions. As explained above, climate finance targets are key enablers for scaling-up climate action in developing countries and more broadly are confidence building measures.


As an immediate step, at COP 26, developed countries need to recognize that the previous climate finance targets have not been met and pledge to make-up for the shortfall. A new pledge, specifically targeting to close the previous shortfall, of $67.4 billion should be made at COP 26. A significant share of this finance should be pledged to flow through the Green Climate Fund. Developed countries should also show progress towards a post 2025 climate finance goal that is based on financial needs for climate action as expressed by developing countries in their NDCs.


In the medium term, there is a critical need to address the shortcomings of the current climate finance system. Improving the metrics and transparency of how developed countries meet their climate finance targets will be critical to restoring confidence of developing countries. Without better metrics and enhanced transparency, there is a risk that future climate finance targets will not be credible. As negotiators start to discuss setting new climate finance goals for 2025 and beyond, they will need to ensure that the approach meets expectations of developing countries with respect to additionality, adequacy, and predictability, and complies with long-standing commitments by developed countries under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement.


African Ministers of Environment called on the Glasgow COP to “set a new post 2025 climate finance mobilization goal with developed countries committing to mobilize jointly at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2030, of which 50% for mitigation and 50% for adaptation and a significant percentage on grant basis from a floor of USD 100 billion, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries and in particular the special circumstances of Africa.” The first Needs Determination Report, adopted at the 26th meeting of the Standing Committee on Finance, noted that the costed needs of developing countries up to 2030 amounted to about USD 5.9 trillion (summarized in Table 2 of the executive summary of the report). These estimates offer relevant benchmarks for the scale of the new climate finance commitments that developed countries should pledge.


For media queries: contact@veritasglobal.ch

Briefing prepared by:



About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.














 
 
 
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